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BLISS

tI. CALIJ'ORNIA COOPERATIVE PRODUCEBS

l30 C.~d

[Sac. Wo. 5729. In Bank. June 3, 1947.]

CHARLES A. BLISS et aI., Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA
COOPERATIVE PRODUCERS (a Cooperative Corporation) et aI., Defendants; I. C. SmDLER et aI.,
Appellants.
[1] Negotiable IDstnunenta -Rolders In Due Oourse-Time of
Transfer. - A transferee of a negotiable installment note
taken after maturity of one or more but less than all of the
installments is not a holder in due eou:rse as to installments
that have become due.
[2] IeL-Holders in Due Course-Time of Transfer.-A transferee
of an installment note is a holder in due course as to installments to mature in the future when the transfer is made after
one or more but not all of the installments are due on its
face, ttnless the past due installments have not in fact been
paid and he has notiee of that faet.
[3] Id.-Actions-Findinp.-In an action by pledgees of installment notes of mf!mbers of the pledg'Or mat'keting corporation
and involving the issue of plaintiff's notice of the failut'e to
pay the first installment, findings that the plaintiffs were bona
fide holders without notice of any defenses and also that they
were not holders in due course are unsatisfactoTy.
[4] OontTactI - Breach - Failure of Oonsideration. - Failure of
consideration is the failure to execute a promise, the performance of which has been exchanged for performance by
the other party. Such failure may arise from the willfnl
breach of the promise.
[6] Id. - Actions-Defentes-Failure of Oonsideration. - Failure
of consideration is a defense to an action for breach of a
bilateral contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the
performance of the ttnilateral promises shall be in exchange
for each other, the performance being considered as equivalent
in value.
[8] Wegotiable Instruments-Oonsideration-Faflure of Oonsideration. - There is a failure of consideration for agricultural
producers' notes executed by members of a cooperative corpo[1] Maturity of one or more of series of notes as affecting
status of purchaser as holder in due course, note, 64 A.L.B. 457;
170 A.L.ll 1029. See, also, 19 OaLJur. 861, 999; 7 Am.Jur. 874;
8 Am.Jur. 178.
Melt. Dig. Beferences: [1, 2] Negotiable Instruments, § 66; [31
Negotiable Instruments, § 280; [4, 7J Contracts, § 241; [5] Contracts, § 274; [6] Negotiable Instruments, § 28; [8] Assignment.,
I 66; [~l JWoppeI, I.; [10] CorpoatioBe, If.
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ration in consideration of the corporation's marketing of the
members' products and paying premiums on policies on the
members' lives, where the corporation, after its insolvency,
fails to handle the members' products and maintain the
policies in effect.
(7) Oontracts - Breach. - The insolvency of a promisor. in a bilateral continuing oontract is tantamOUDt to a breach of the
contract by him.
. [8] Assignments - Bights and LiabUitf.ea of Parties - Defensea
. Available ApiDst Assipeea. -Generally, an assignee of a
ohose in action takes subject to all equities and defenses existing at or before the notice of the assignment. But where there
is a failure of consideration under a bilateral contract consisting of a breaoh by the assignor, such failure is a good
· defense to an action by the assignee, whether it occurred before or after the notice of assignment.
· Est;oppel-Conduct.-Where agricultural produoers' notes exe· ented by members of a oooperative corporation in consider· ation of the corporation's marketing of the members' products
and paying premiums on policies on the members' lives were
. pledged by the corporation as security for its note, and that
fact was known to members of the corporation, the mere fact
that they continued to market their products through the
corporation did not estop them, in an action on the notes,
from raising the defense of failure of consideration based on
the eOrporation's subsequent insolvency.
Corporations-Disregard of Oorporate BntitJ'.-m an action
agricultural producers' notes pledged by a cooperative
. corporation as security for its note to plaintifts, there was ne
'. basis for disregarding the corporate entity and considering
'it the alter ego of its members where it was not a nonstaek,
,"nonproftt corporation but one in which persons other than
Itoekholders could share in the proftts, and where it borrowed
,from plainti«s on its own liability, not on that of the mam,ben.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of SaeraC. Glenn, Judge. Reversed.

,.County. Kaleolm
'.a.VI.uM.l

on promisso17 notes. Judgment for plaiDti1ls No

J. GalhnMla, In pt:O. per., ad Kuldary " lIIkiIapm for

)

)
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Albert C. Agnew, John A. O'Kane, Louis Ferrari, Brobeck,
Phlegcr & Harrison, Randall Boyd, Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman & Clark, Richard W. Young, Cooley, Crowley,
Gaither & Dana, and Wm. J. Murphy as Amici Curiae, on behalf of Respondents.
CARTER, J.--Judgment was given for plaintiffs against
defendants a.nd appellants Shidler, Winchester and Galbreath
on three promis.~ory notes of which they were the makers.
Their defenses, among others, were fraud and failure of consideration. Plaintiffs are the transferees of the notes, the
payee being California Cooperative Producers, a corporation.
The series of events leading up to the execution of the notes
had their beginning in 1926. In that year the idea was conceived by Mr. Johnson, president of the Union Construction
Company, and a Mr. Campbell, to use the shipping terminal
facilities and property at the harbor in Oakland, California,
then held by the Union Construction Company under a lease
from the city of Oakland, for a terminal for processing and
shipping agricultural products. It was proposed to form a
corporation to be known as California Cooperative Producers
(hereinafter referred to as the corporation, which was later
formed), as the instrumentality to conduct the enterprise. A
promotional firm, Allen, Hobson and Simons, a copartnership, was engaged under contract of April 15, 1927, to pro- '
mote and organize the business and conduct a campaign to
induce growers of agricultural products to let the corporation
handle their products. The corporation was incorporated on
April 26, 1927, with a capital stock of $15,000 ullJcr the then
section 653 (a) of the Civil Code authorizing ordinary business corporations to divide a portion of their profits among
persons other than their stockholders. The stock (other than
director's qualifying shares) was to be issued only to associations of producers (which were to be organized) who marketed
their products through the corporation. Johnson was named
president and Hobson and Allen directors of the corporation.
Pursnant to a permit therefor one share of stock was issued
to each director.
The promotional firm launched its drive, made financial
arrangements, and obtained manufacturing and marketing
contracts, hereafter called marketing contracts, for the corporation from many producers of agricultural products, including the three appellants, in which the producers agreed
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to market their products through the corporation. Appellants, as producers, were members of either one or the other
of two producers' associations formed pursuant to the plan.
The associations' manufacturing and marketing agreement,
hereafter referred to as association contract, with its memberproducers and the marketing contracts required its members
... to deliver their products to the corporation. The marketing
oOlIltra.cts called for the procurement of policies of insurance
the lives of the producers, the corporation to pay the
premiums, and provided: "In order to assist in the manutaetnring and/or marketing of said products, and in further
eoDsideration of the payment of the premiums on policies of
endowment life insurance on the life (name of defendant
III£gning same) for the amount of (amount of insurance is, and when issued and assigned to California Cooper. a't{ve Producers, said producer hereby extends his credit to
California Cooperative Producers in the amount of a certain
(Jl~lniSISOl~ note of even date herewith in the principal sum of
~:......;..- (amount of note executed, and sued for herein) made
._~~.__.. _ producer in favor of said California Cooperative ProThe notes involved were executed in 1927 as a part
" transaction by appellants and were noninterest bearing
llellOtlable instruments payable in annual installments. The
of the notes was arrived at by an estimate of the
produce to be delivered by the producer and maker of
to the corporation.
17. 1928, the corporation pledged the notes to
~inti1fs, together with others, as security for the payment of
for $5,000 in which the corporation was maker and
. 'payees. The pledge was made in the usual course of
and under circumstances which would indicate that
~IL.uLIf were holders in due course and thus the defenses
a'lfS"U would not be available unless some other factor took
of the favored position.
found that plaintiffs acquired the notes in good
without notice of any defenses of appellants. (As
the defenses were fraud and failure of considerThe first installment on the principal of appellants'
due on ,January 2, 1928. The transfer (on
17, 1928) was after that date, hence we have the issue
.
a transferee of an installment note is a holder in
IO'ftI,n_."" where the tr!ln~fcl' is mnde after one or more but
ali. of the installments are due. (In this connection

244

BLISS

tI.

CALIFORNIA COOPERATIVE

PRODUCEBS

[30 C.2d

it should be noted that in the instant case the notes did not
contain an automatic acceleration clause upon default in the
payment of an installment, thus we do not decide the law in
that situation.)
[1] On the issue of whether or not the transferee of a
negotiable installment note taken after the maturity of one
or more or less than all of the installments, is a holder in due
course, reference must first be made to the negotiable instruments law as embodied in our statutes: .. A holder in due
course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions: (1) ..• (2) That he became the holder
of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been
previously dishonored, if such was the fact"; (Civ. Code, I
§ 3133.) "The instrument is dishonored by nonpayment when I
(1) ... (2) Presentment is excused and the instrument is
overdue and unpaid." (Civ. Code, § 3164.) To determine!
whether a note is "overdue" when less than all of the installments are unpaid it must be noted that installment notes are
expressly made negotiable by the statute. "The sum payable
is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is
to be paid-(l) . " (2) By stated installm6ft.fI; or (3) By
stated installments, with a provision that upon default in
payment for any installment or of interest, the whole shall
become due" [emphasiR added] (Civ. Code, § 3083), and th .
policy is stated: "There is no doubt that the fact that a no
is payable by installments does not destroy its negotiability.
The authorities seem to be in favor of the continued negotia
bility of the note after the indorsement of payments thereo
In ease of an installment note, the time for the payment 0
each installment is fixed 80 that it is within the rule requirin
certainty as to time of payment. By the Uniform Act it .
declared that the sum payable is a sum certain although it .
to be paid by stated installments." (7 Am.Jur., Bills an
Notes, § 150.) This policy would be impaired if a note
came in effect nonnegotiable before less than all of the install
ments became due. A vast number of credit transactiO~
might be thus jeopardized. As to the installments that hav
become due the transferee cannot be a holder in due COUl'S
/ for that portion of the note is undoubtedly overdue but
to the future installments he mayor may not be such
holder, depending upon the factors presently discussed.
[9] It has been stated repeatedly, as a general propos]
tion, under the negotiable instruments law and the commol
r

I
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. JaW that the transferee of an installment note is not a holder
in due course as to any part of the note when the transfer
. haB been made after the maturity of one or more but less
~. than all of the installments. (Cases in which uniform nego~'\iable instruments law not mentioned: HaZZ v. E. W. Wells
SOfa, 24 Cal.App. 238 [141 P. 53]; Archtoald Hardwar, Co.
Rt.ff,ord. 44 Ga.App. 837 [163 S.E. 254; General Motors
~r:,f_ce Corp v. Talbott, 39 Idaho 707 [230 P. 30]; VinKing, 4 Allen (Mass.) 562; McCorkle v. Miller, 64 1\10•
. 153; turns on lack of payment Shadman v. O'Brien. 278
579 [180 N.E. 532]: Norwood v. Leeves (Tex.Civ.App.).
W. 53; First Nat. Bank v. Forsyth, 67 Minn. 257 [69
'.. 909. '64 Am.St.Rep. 415 J. Cases decided under the
"'""""~.;.;,'- negotiable instruments law: Hibbard v. Collim, 127
[143 A. 600]; City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity c6
Co., 105 F.2d 348 [123 A.L.R. 1352]; United States
55 F.Supp. 81; see 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, § 312;
Negotiable Instruments [7th ed.], vol. 2. § 910;
11aJn'.£~..u.oI:JY. 464; 40 Barv.L.Rev. 634; 8 Am.Jur., Bills
.
§ 432; 64 A.L.R. 457.) These cases stresS the point
.the' installment was unpaid as well as being overdue on
. • .factor of significance. More is required. There
little free commerce in installment instruments if
accept::ing the same the transferee was required to ascerwhlBthlar or not the past due installments had been paid.
. may assume that the regular course of business has
.[fOllawed (Code Civ. Proo., § 1963), and that each installpaid when due. It is not significant, like it is where
l::.1JrJlo][e prin'CiPlU is overdue, that the note is still in the
payee or holder. Where the whole principal is
that should warn the transferee that the note prob.been dishonored and there may be some reason for
would constitute a defense. The possession by the
of an installment note before all of the install,due does not signify dishonor. The holder would
retain it for collection of the balance of the inIf, however, the installments due on the face of
:'m!lti'1lDD.llmt have not been paid and the framferN ha.t
. ,fhGf facf, he is put on inquiry that there may be
r cI.4~eIlSe8 against it and he cannot be a holder in due
is said in United States v. Copen, 55 F.Supp. 81,
"-uJ""_.~ the principal of a note is payable in installments
iDstallment is overdue and unpaid at the time of

)
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transfer of the note, the transferee is not a holder before
maturity and hence is not a holder in due course, unless he
does not take with notice of the past-due installment."
[Emphasis added.] Therefore, the rule is that a transferee
of an installment note is a holder in due course as to the
installments to mature in the future when the transfer is
made after one or more but not all of the installments are due
on its face unless the past due installments hne not in faet
been paid and he has notice of that fact.
The decision in this case must turn on whether the installment due on January 2,. 1928. had been paid, and if not,
whether plaintiffs had notice thereof. In regard to payment
of the first installment, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint i
that no part of the principal had been paid on any of appellants' notes, an allegation in substance that the first install- :
ment had not been paid. That allegation was denied by ap- :
pellants, which amounts to an assertion that the installment
had been paid. We thus have the peculiar situation of plaintiffs and appellants taking positions in their pleadings opposite to their interests under the rule of law as above stated.
Under that rule plaintiffs' position now requires a claim that
the installment was paid, and appellants, that it was unpaid.
The court found that all of plaintiff~' allegations were true,
thus finding that the first installment had not been paid. It
also found (and it would Reem to be conflieting) that pUrsu!:ut
to the marketing contracts appellants delivered produce to
the corporation in 1927. and the corporation on August 31,
1928 (after the transfer of the notes) entered credits on its
books for the first installment; that plaintiffs were not holders
in due course because the note.~ were transferred after the
first installment was due but that "plaintiffs were purchasers
and holders of said notes in good faith and for value and
without notice of any equity or defense in favor of defendants or any of them; and in this connection the court finds
that in each instance said California Cooperative Producem
had in its possession and under its control pursuant to and
under the said Financing and Manufacturing and Marketing
Agreement on said 2nd day of February, 1928. money, property or credits belonging to each of said defendants. being the
products or the proceeds of the products of such defendants,
delivered pursuant to said Financing and Manufacturing and
Marketing Agreement suffieient in value or amount to pay,
satisfy and discharge the amount of said First Installment
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payments of each of said respective promissory notes in full."
The court further found that the notes were not to be paid
by credits for fruit deli\'ered by the growers (appellants)
- stating: "It is not true that it was represented by said Produeers to said defendants [appellants], or any of them, that
DO payment would be required to be made by the signers of
Iiid notes; or that as each yearly installment became on the
'face of the note due or payable to said California Cooperative
Producers, said California Cooperative Producers would debit
.~ balance of the amount of the yearly installment then due
'to 8I1id signer of said note or charge the same against said
'Signers credit balance. if any, or that thereafter said Producers would assign said sums or any sum, to corporate reffJ'fIS, or any reserves, except as is stated in said Financing
iiul. Manufaeturing and Marketing Agreement." The court
t~ judgment for plainti1fs which included the first installthe instance of appellant Winchester, but not as to
: Other two appellants. The conclusion as to the latter
',p:pelllaD'ts was based. however, on the finding that the statute
UDl.ita1:ion had run upon the first installment as to those
It is evident from the foregoing that the court
that the crop which had been delivered to the corpora.by appellants did not constitute payment. Although it
the existence of the credits by the delivery of the crop
" fhat the first instaUment had not been paid and gave
{JndglneJlt for it, thus indicating that it considered that the
rtirlBdi1t& did not constitute payment. a matter which may have
fJUrnelCl on the intention of the parties. Therefore, it has been
lJ!~milled in this case that the first of the two conditions,
1l0l1pll.yment of the past due installment, which makes
~;nsj:en!C after maturity of one of the installments not a
in due course, is present.
On the subject of notice to plaintiifs of appellants'
Dflltfte to pay the first installment, the findings are unsatis.JtOr,,~' It is found that they (plaintUfs) were bona fide
without notice of any defenses, but it is also fonnd
!
they were not holders in due course. They may not have
/
notice of any defenses, yet they may have had notice of
de1fault and thus were put upon inquiry. In the latter
they would not be holders in due course. It is evident
the ftndings that the court did not consider the case in
light of the law as heretofore stated. The evidence with
Bd~eNnft8 to the existence of notice is sketchy. Precisely what

'.aent m
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was done and said when the notes were transferred is not
clear. The $5,000 note for which the instant collateral notes
were given as security states: "This note is secured by a
pledge of the following installment notes, pa~ble to the order
of the maker hereof." Then follows three columns designated
"Name of Maker," "Date of Note" and "Amount," respectively, under which each note is listed (Jim.g the fulZ f(JCe
amott.f of fhe fI,Ofe. It might be inferred from the foregoing
that the l1rst installment had not been paid. In the state of
the evidence and the findings we believe the issue of notice
should be retried. In the event it is found that plaintifrs had
notice, and were not therefore holders in due course, for the
guidance of the court we will discuss the issues pertinent to
the defenses interposed by appellants.
Thus turning to appellants' defenses, the court found that
the corporation and its omcers were the agents of appellants
in the marketing of their products. The stock of the corporation was to be issued to associations of producers. The corporation was "in effect owned" by the associations of whieh
appellants were members. The notes executed by appellants
were part of the same transaction in which they executed the
marketing and association contracts. The interest on the
$5,000 note delivered to plaintiffs by the corporation was paid
until July 17, 1930, but none of the prineipal was paid although $4,000 of it became due before that date. On the issue
of appellants' defense of failure of consideration or failure by
the eorporation to perform under the marketing contract, it
appears that the corporation failed to pay the premiums on
the insurance polieies after .July, 1930: that because of its
insolvency, it has failed to and eould not since then pay such
premiums or process, manufacture or market appellants'
products. Failure of consideration is a good defense to an
action on a negotiable instrument by one not a holder in due
course. (Civ. Code, § 3109.) [4] Failure of consideration
is the failure to execute a promise, the performance of which
has been exchanged for performance by the other party.
Among other situations, the failure may arise from the wilful
breach of the promise. [15] And in a bilateral contract, such
failure of consideration is a defense to an action for a breach
of the contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the performance of the unilateral promises shall be in exchange for
each other, the performance 'being con.cddered as equivalent in
ftlue. It is said in BrGf v. Lowef'1/, 163 CaL 256, 260 [124:
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P. 1004]: "This case therefore comes within the rule stated
in Richter v. Union Land &; Stock 00., 129 Cal. [367] 372 [62
P. 40], as follows: 'In all executory contracts the several
.' obligations of the parties constitute to each, reciprocally, the
. eonsideration of the contract; and a failure to perform consti.
a failure of consideration-either partial or total, as
case may be-within the meaning of section 1689 of the
Code.' (See, also, Sterling v. Gregory, 149 Cal. {117],
(85 P. 305], and Oleary v. Polger, 84 Cal. 316 [18 Am.St.
187, 24 P. 280J.)" (See, also, Mulborn v. Montezuma
00.,69 Cal.App. 621, 628 [232 P. 162]; Rest., Contracts,
et seq.; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), vol. 3, §§ 813[8] In the instant case, although there was no expromise in the marketing contract on the part of the
~"Dl'1llOnlticln to process and market appellants-producers' prod- .
nor a fixed time during which the producers agreed to .
f;·,tll ...., .._
their products to the corporation, we believe it may ,
be implied that the promises in that connection were to
for at least ten years inasmuch as the notes were payable
annual installments. It will be noted from the hereIf"frrl'm'" quoted paragraph from said contract, that in order to
in the marketing and processing of the products, and in
~'*,I.lf"t.".•f" consideration t)f the payment by the corporation of
premiums on the insurance policies, the notes were given.
. were given as an extension of credit to the corporation,
IIInllvn".,. that the corporation was to continue its activities
the insurance policies in return for the conltIil1Ultion of the extension of credit by the notes which were
'It'y;"U~'" not in a lump sum, but in ten annual installments.
court found that the notes were executed for the pur. mentioned in the marketing contracts and "at the same
.' and as a part of the respective transactions." The court
. found that from 1927 to 1930 pursuant to the marketing
. . appellants delivered their products to the corporathe eorporation entereel creelib tm its books as payon the notes, indicating that the continued operation
eorporation was exchanged for the payment of the
D:t~issc)ry note&. A further indication of the reciprocal
OUitu:J:oe of the promise in the notes and that of the corporation
[*1.pears from the following clause in the marketing contracts:
, releue of the Producer from tkli11ering his Hid prodor any part thereof in accordance with said ManufacturMarketinr .Agreement, or a failure on his part 80 to
" ........... JLY
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was done and said when the notes were transferred is not
clear. The $5,000 note for which the instant collateral notes
were given as security states: "This note is secured by a
pledge of the following installment notes, payable to the order
of the maker hereof." Then follows three columns designated
''Name of Maker," "Date of Note" and "Amount," respectively, under which each note is listed gimng the fun face
amount of the 1tOte. It might be inferred from the foregoing
that the first installment had not been paid. In the state of
the evidence and the findings we believe the issue of notice
should be retried. In the event it is found that plaintitts had
notice, and were not therefore holders in due course, for the
guidance of the court we will discuss the issues pertinent to
the defenses interposed by appellants.
Thus turning to appellants' defenses, the court found that
the corporation and its officers were the agents of appellants
in the marketing of their products. The stock of the corporadon was to be issued to associations of producers. The corporation was "in effect owned" by the associations of which
appellants were members. The notes executed by appellants
were part of the same transaction in which they executed the
marketing and association contracts. The interest on the
$5,000 note delivered to plaintitts by the corporation was paid
until July 17, 1930, but none of the principal was paid although $4,000 of it became due before that date. On the issue
of appellants' defense of failure of consideration or failure by
the corporation to perform under the marketing contract, it
appears that the corporation failed to pay the premiums on
the insurance policies after .July, 1930; that because of its
insolvency, it has failed to and could not since then pay such
premiums or process, manufacture or market appellants'
products. Failure of consideration is a good defense to an
action on a negotiable instrument by one not a holder in due
course. (Oiv. Code, § 3109.) [4] Failure of consideration
is the failure to execute a promise, the performance of which
has been exchanged for performance by the other party.
Among other situations, the failure may arise from the wilful
breach of the promise. [IS] And in a bilateral contract, such
failure of consideration is a defense to an action for a breach
of the contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the performance of the unilateral promises shall be in exchange for
each other, the performance being considered as equivalent in
value. It is said in BrGf/ v. 'Lowery, 163 Cal 256, 260 [124

I
i

I
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P. 10041: "This ease therefore comes within the rule stated
in Bichter v.UnWft Land" Stock Co., 129 Cal. [367] 372 [62
P. 401, as follows: 'In all executory contracts the severa]
obliga1t101!18 of the parties constitute to each, reciprocally, the
OOIll8icie1'llticln of the contract; and a failure to perform constia failure of consideration-either partial or total, as
case may be-within the meaning of section 1689 of the
Code.' (See, also, Sterling v. Gregory, 149 Cal. [117],
(85 P. 305], and Cleary v. Folger, 84 Cal. 316 [18 Am.St.
187, 24 P. 280].)" (See, also. Mulbom v. Montezuma
Co., 69 Cal.App. 621, 628 [232 P. 162]; Rest., Contracts,
et seq.; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), vol. 3, §§ 813[8] In the instant ease, although there was no expromise in the marketing contract on the part of the
I:"Di'IlI01'l~ti(l.n to process and market appellants-producers' prodnor a fixed time during which the producers agreed to
. their products to the corporation, we believe it may ,
I:tdrllY be implied that the promises in that connection were to :
for at least ten years inasmuch as the notes were payable
annual installments. It will be noted from the here~tc)fm~ quoted paragraph from said contract, that in order to
in the marketing and processing of the products. and in
~~~,,","er COtl8iderGnon. I)f the payment by the corporation of
premiums on the insurance policies, the notes were given.
. were given as an extension of credit to. the corporation,
mnllvDlup that the corporation was to continue ita activities
mamtam the insurance policies in return for the conDlii1Ulti(lU of the extension of credit by the notes which were
!ll,Ya,w." 'not in a lump sum, but in ten annul installments.
found that the notes were executed for the purmentionEId in the marketing contracts and "at the same
as a part of the respective transactions." The court
iJaA;·~_._" that from 1927 to 1930 pur8'IUJnt to the marketing
.'Ncb appellan.ta delivered their products. to the corporathe corporation en.tered credit. Oft it. books as pay~1l'tI OIl the nOtes, indicating that the continued OPeNtion
corporation was exchanged for the payment of the
~!Om_)ry DOtal. A further indication of the reciprocal
0ii1me of the promise in the notes and that of the corporation
Mpea:ra from the following e1ause in the marketing contracts:
. reltM. of the Producer from deUtI.ring Au MJid prodor any part thereof in accordance with said ManufacturMarketiq Agreement, or a failure on his part 80 to

/
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deliver his said products or any part thereof, shaZl 110t release
the maker from any pot·tion of his liability under said promissory note." [Emphasis added.] The producers were obligated on the note even if they violated their agreement to
deliver their produce. It necessarily follows that if they did
deliver their products and were able and willing to do so in
the future, the corporation was under an equal obligation to
continue to receive, process and market it as long as the installments on the notes continued to become due.
The breach of the marketing contracts consisted of the
failure after 1930 to handle appallants' products and maintain
the insurance policies in force arising from the voluntary
bankruptcy of the corporation in that year rendering it incapable of further performance. [7] The insolvency of a
promisor in a bilateral continuing contract is tantamount to a
breach of the contract by him. rOaminetti v. Pacific Mnt.
Life Ins. 00., 23 Cal.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741]; Oentral Trust 00.
v. Ohicago Auditorium Assn., 240 U.S. 581 [36 S.Ct. 412, 60
L.Ed. 811].)
PlaintUfs urge that the asserted failure of consideration did
not occur until after appellants had notice of the transfer of
their notes to plaintUfs and thus the failure of consideration
is not a defense. [8] The general rule is that an assignee
of a chose in action is subject to all equities and defenses
existing at or before the notice of the assignment. (Civ.
Code, § 1459; Code Civ. Proc., § 368; 3 Cal.Jur. pp. 286-289.)
But where there is a failure of consideration under a bilateral
contract consisting of a breach by the assignor, such failure
is a good defense to an action by the assignee whether it occurred before or after the notice of assignment. It is said:
"On the other hand, payment to the assignor or other defenses acquired by the debtor against the assignor after notice
of the assignment are invalid, unless the defense, though acquired after notice, is based on a right of the defendant inhere",t in the contract by its terms; Thus if payments under
aft. e:ucutory contract are assigned, the debtor may set up
failure of the assignor to fulfil1, his pari of the contract though
such fa,&7/ure occurs after notice of the assignment, for the
assignor cannot give another 8 larger right than he has himself; ..." [Emphasis added.] (Williston on Contract, (rev.
ed.), vol. 2, § 433.) In Stern v. Sunset Road Otl 00., 47 Cal
App. 334 [190 P. 651], the court held that recoupment was
available to the debtor against the assignee althougb the
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breach of the contract by the assignor occurred after notice of
the assignment. (See, also, Pacific RoZling Mill Co. v. EngZish,
118 Cal. 123 [50 P. 383]; Rest., Contracts, §§ 161, 167(1),
i
illus. 3.} Plaintifrs refer to the statement in 19 California
Jurisprudence page 1002 that: "[A] failure of consideration
bi whole or in part after the transfer of an instrument to a
· bona fide holder is no defense in a suit by such holder, notwithstanding his full knowledge of the original consideration
· for which the paper was given." The cases cited for that
proposition (Flood v. Petry, 165 Cal. 309 [132 P. 256, 46
L.B.A.N.S. 861J; Bank of TJkio,h v. Gibson, 109 Cal. 197 [41
P. 1008]; SplivaZlo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 {99 Am.Dec. 358];
· Pratt v. Dittmer, 51 Cal.App. 512 [197 P. 365]; First Nat.
Bnk v. Pickert, 51 Cal.App. 99 [196 P. 112]) concern sima. dons where a negotiable note given as a part of a contract
l;tranB&C1aon was transferred before maturity to a bona fide
Dm~~ in the regular course of business. In other words,
transferee was a holder in due course. The court merely
that the knowledge of the transferee that the note was
.. consideration for an executory promise in the eon.but without notice that the promise had not been per:l.UJ:W"",,, was insuJ1ieient to destroy his status as a holder in
.
In the instant ease, assuming that plaintifrs were
hOl(lers in due course because of notice of nonpayment of
ins1~neIllt, the availability of the defense here asserted
dependent upon actual notice of equities in. favor of
1;.~p.Pelllan·ts. The general rule has been repeatedly stated that
.4tt~81!JSignee of a note who is not a holder in due course takes
.lllbjelOt to all defenses that would be available against the
I:dlqllOr, one of such defenses being failure of consideration.
E~.:,?liiUJi1;i1fs contend that there was no failure of consideration
notes were pledged to them. (That, as we have
.........-,-•. --. immaterial) [9] And further, that appellants have
,-,~yed the fraitI of the marketing contract with the corporahence are estopped to raise the defense of failure of
E~.~eJl'8.ti.on. The failure of consideration was, as above
failure and inability after insolvency of the corpo1fi-f''''''''"U to continue to accept, process and market appellants'
.1~lucts and maintain the life insurance policies in effect.
connection the court found : "That on or about the
day of May, 1928 [appellants] became aware of the
..
of their respective notes • • • to plainti1fs, . • . ;
, 'said [corporation] was declared a baDkrupt _ _ vol...
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tary petition September 5th, 1930; that during the whole time
between said dates, [appellants] continued as members of
said corporation and said producers associations [the associations who were stockholders in the corporation] and delivered
and marketed their products through said corporation, enjoyed and received the· benefits of the insurance on their
respective lives, the premiums on which insurance were paid
by the corporation; aceepted and retained the benefits of the
money borrowed from plaintiffs [the $5,000 borrowed by the
corporation for which appellants' notes were pledged as security], which money was used in the processing and marketing
of the products of [appellants], as above recited, and all other
bene:6ts of their membership in and affiliation with said [corporation] and said Growers Associations, but they never at
any time repudiated or rescinded or attempted to rescind the
said transactions between themselves and said corporation or
between said corporations and plaintiffs herein.
". • • That [appellants] ~ by the execution of said • • •
){arkating [contract] .•• by the execution of said notes, and
by delivering the same to said corporation for the purpose of
extending to it their credit in the amount of said notes,
thereby enabling said corporation to borrow said $5,000 from
plaintiffs; by the receipt of the benefits of life insurance on
their respective lives, and the benefits of said loan by plaintUrs to said defendant corporation, and by all other benefits
provided in said ••• Marketing [contraet]; and by continuing as members of said corporation after the borrowing of
said money as aforesaid, and after they had knowledge of the
borrowing of said money as aforesaid, and after having knowledge of the transfer of their notes as security therefor, and
all of the other matters and things herein found to be tru_,
said [appellants], rati:6ed the acts of said corporation in horrowing said money from plaintUfs, and transferring said notes
to plainti1fs as security for its repayment; and they are by
their said acts and conduct, and by the benefits they received
as herein found, estopped from setting up &DT defense to this
action on the ground of any alleged fraud ••• , or from making any other defense thereto, • • • and that by their said
acts and conduct as herein found, said defendants waived any
and all rights that they may or might have had to set up
&DT defense to this action on the ground of any alleged fraud
practiced by their said agent, California Cooperative Proa.e., • itI apnt, .. from makinl aDT other defensea

)
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thereto, as to the matters hereinabove found." We do not
find any estoppel or reason springing from the foregoing
circumstances which prevent appellants defending on the
ground of failure of consideration. The awareness on their
part of the pledge of their notes to secure the payment of
the $5,000 did not impose upon them any duty with respect to
the assignees. They could assume that inasmuch as the assignees had no greater rights then, and were subject to the
same defenses as the corporation-assignor, they would govern
their acts and protect themselves accordingly. Certainly they
continued as members of the associations, which were stock. holders in the corporation, and delivered their products to the
corporation. They were bound to do that under the market.
and association contracts and were privileged to assume
the corporation would continue its performance and that
plaintiffs-assignees would be subject to the defenses ariafrom the failure of the corporation-assignor to perform.
APPl;U.lAUUS did receive the benefits of the marketing contracts
r/::lIl1'iclr to insolvency but they were entitled to receive them
those contracts. Plaintiffs cite Maddock v. Russen, 109
417 [42 P. 139], and Rohrbacher v. KleebaU6r, 119 Cal.
P. 341J, for the proposition that appellants cannot
fl~I)D).]~lalin because they have enjoyed the fruits of the contracts.
are not in point inasmuch as the contracts here
.~nvl,I",~ are the marketing contracts and there has been a
.~aill1re of consideration therein as above stated. The corporahas been unable to perform since 1930. Appellants did
rescind the contracts. They had no grounds for doing 80
. far as failure of consideration is concerned. There was no
1~a.il11re of consideration until the insolvency of the corporaAppellants did nothing to mislead plaintiffs. It is not
that they promised to pay the $5,000 the corporation
.
or to pay to plaintiffs the notes executed by them.
'... to the insolvency they did not waive the defense of
. of consideration. It had not falled as yet and there
JjncJtblinQ/ to indicate that they did 80 as to a future possia breach by the corporation.
Running through the above quoted finding of the
an undercurrent intimating that the corporation was
ego of the appellants-producers and the associations
they belonged; that the insolvency was their act;
.that hence the $5,000 note was really their note. The
, also found that the corporation "was in effect owned b1:

/
/
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said 'Producers Associations' composed of the fruit growers,
the latter constituting the membership of the 'Producers Association,' and these fruit growers were also direct.Iy connected with the California Cooperative Producers by the
Financing, Manufactu.ring and Marketing agreement executed by each ()f them." And that "said corporation and
its officers were agents of [appellants) in the marketing of
their products." We see no basis for disregarding the corporate entity. It was not a nonstock, nonprofit cooperative
corporation. It WiiS one in which persons other than stockholders could share in the profits. Accepting the agency relationship the marketing contracts were still binding and the
corporation-agent was obligated to perform theretmder. The
.borrowing of the $5,000 by the corporation from plaintiffs
was on its own liability, not on that of the members. If that
were not so, we would be disregarding the corporate entity, :
and the action would have been on the $5,000 note rather than·
the pledged notes. The corporation was the agent of appellants in the sense that it was a processing and marketing agent
for the producers. It is true that appellant Galbreath became
a director of the corporation after the $5,000 note was given
and appellants' notes were pledged but that still does not
prevent him from asserting failure of consideration under a
contract he had with the corporation. It was still a corporate
entity. There is no finding that the voluntary bankruptcy
of the corporation was not in good faith. As far as appears
no other course was open. Indeed on the subject of disregarding the corporate entity, plaintiffs state in their brief: "Plaintiffs have not at any time contended that the Cooperative was
in law the alter ego of Appellants.
"It should also be borne in mind that this is not an action
to enforce shareholders' liability, although a number of the
statements in the opening brief might lead the casual reader
to so believe. As appellants have stated, it had already been
decided that the shareholders were liable on the Corporation
note here involved; but they have not met that obligation.
This is an action upon promissory notes executed by Appellants to the California Cooperative Producers and by that
organization pledged to the Plaintiffs and Respondents. By
reason of the nature of the defenses interposed by the Defendants, it has become necessary to show that they were so
closely related to the Cooperative that they cannot escape
liability on those notes by the defenses relied. upon."
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r.p" It will be recalled that as to appellant Winchester judgment

';"i-h'

t~

given for the face amount of the note including the first
Inasmuch as it is now conceded by plaintiffs
this appellant was entitled to a credit for the amount of
installment that portion of the judgment cannot stand.
the other appellants the statute of limitation was found
run on the first installment of each of said notes.
judgment is reversed and the case may be retried only
the issue of notice of nonpayment of the first installment
time of the transfer, and judgment may thereafter be
in accordance with the views expressed herein in the
the
determination of the issue of notice.
;

C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-

)

)

J.-I dissent.
, opinion it is unnecessary to remand this case to the
_Tl' .._·...·,.... for a finding on the question of notice, since the
aha the evidence show that plaintiffs took the notes
'notice that the first installments had not been paid. ,
I.'IIiDl'eOVElr. I do not understand by what reasoning my associ- !
'I'M.p.hf'ilI the conclusion that despite a finding that the trans'of an installment note acted in good faith and the fact
inquiry wouid have revealed no defenses he cannot as
of law be a holder in due course if he acquires the
notice of the nonpayment of a past due installment.
, tlrit question to determine is whether the first installdue and unpaid at the time the notes were pledged.
'confusion in the findings as to whether under the
, agreement. payment was made upon defendants'
frUit of enough value to meet each installment as
due. or upon the payee's deducting the amount of
~I4l.WU'ml' from the proceeds from the sale of the fruit.
,found that the payee had in its possession on
of the first installments, money and property or
defendants "sufficient in value or amount' to pay,
dIscharge the amount of said First installment
of each of said respective promissory notes in full."
.. , property, or credits referred to consisted of fruit
.
from the sale thereof. There was evidence
nrloo~P.rl~ alone would not cover the first installments
date thereof. It may be assumed for the purpose
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of this opinion, therefore, that the first installments were unpaid when the notes were pledged. The question then arises
whether plainti1fs are holders in due course.
A holder in due course is defined in section 3133 of the Civil
Code (N.I.L., § 52) as follows:
.. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the
instrument under the following conditions:
"(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face;
.. (2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
ff (8) That he took it in good faith and for value;
"(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating it...
No question is raised with respect to subdivisions (1) and
(3). Any conclusion that plaintiifA are not holders in due
eourse must therefore be based on subdivision (2) or (4).
The first major issue presented under these subdivisions is
whether plainti1fR were precluded from being holders in due
course merely because the maturity date of the first installments had passed before they acquired the notes.
Subdivision (2) specifies two conditions: The holder must
have taken the instrument (a) before it was overdue and (b)
without notice that it had been "previously dishonored. if
such was the fact."
1. ,. tMall",.f Mf. otI.rdue '" if, .",n,..tll ",1"", if u
'I,."""f.rred "ffer fl. due Mt. of Gft tMall",." An installment note is of course overdue as to installments due before
the date of transfer, and, under subdivision (2), a transferee
thereof cannot be a holder in due course as to such installments. In the absence of the operation of an acceleration
clause, however, the fact that the maturity date of one or
more installments has p8Slled cannot make the instrument
overdue as to installments payable in the future. The instrument is in part overdue and in part not. Is it overdue within
the meaning of subdivision (2)' An instrument is not overdue until the specified maturity of the principal obligation.
An installment note, however. has several maturities, and if
the maturity of each installment is regarded as the' maturity
of the instrument, then the instrument would be overdue after
the maturity of the lIrst installment. (See 40 Harv.L.Rev.
8M, 636.) This interpretation would make the instrument

)

"

/
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The more realistic interpretation, and the
in accord with the expressed intention of the Uniform
Instruments Act to make installment notes nego..
(Civ. Code, § 3083, N.I.L., § 2), would be that the in)Ii11J1D4m':t,. like the principal obligation, is overdue only as to
. installments. but not as to installments payable in
A contrary holding would render installment
DOlmegotlablle after the due date of the first installment.
a transferee could thereafter be a holder in due course
.. subsequent installments were paid, he wouldstlll
lUIIlena.in at his peril whether the previous installbeen paid. Thus the privilege of a holder of a
instrument to be free from a duty to inquire into
~.til[JJl8 between previous parties to the instrument would
holder of an instrument payable in installments.
··D'IIlI. .lr,..,1III who 1uJs Gequired the fWte after tit!. itt.SftlUIIlIIfuto'Ad.. without fWfice of its tI.OtI.ptJ"",et!.t, tI purfWtic8 tMt the fWte 1uJs beet!. prMJio'Usly disif it is assumed that the nonpayment of one
JnstaDlments is tantamount to dishonor of the whole
. the holder has no notice of dishonor unless he has
'of nonpayment. Circulation of the instrument after
.date of an installment except the last cannot serve as
. the installment has not been paid. for the instru. designed to circulate until the maturity date of
A transferee has no reason to conclude
Pler8 faet that the note circulates after the due date
~. ,.
installments that such installments were not
assume that the ordinary course of business
and that the installments have been paid .
... ~~~ § 1963(20).) Nor need the transferee of
bilrbon,mAl1t, find a dated receipt on the note for each
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act
Dro,ride for such notations, and in any event they
on the instrument by the transferor even
had not in fact been paid.

, '"

......." • •TI _ _ •• ::.

:L.. ..... T I _

/

I.;"",diawitm (4) of ,ecfiott. BtBB preclude tJ frfYMfere~,
~~_1Ir ita due course whet!. he htJ8 fW fWM of the fGet
1Wi~"",tJUt"'Mlr WtJ8 fWt paid wAetl due' Since the trans-

IIBtlDle that the matured installments have been
_ ......~ he has no notice from the note itself of the
past, installments mereq because the note ja

!
i
!

I

I
I
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D061 notice of the nonpayment
~:'fwfice of dislumor of the entire

of an installment constitute
note' Section 3164 of the
Code (N.I.L., § 83) provides: "The instrument is dis;t.hcmo:reC1 for nonpayment when-(l)It is duly presented for
~DayJneln and payment is refused 01' cannot be obtained; or
Presentment is excused and the instrument is ove1'due
unpaid." Presentment was waived on the notes involved
.~.,~i& ease and thenfon the instruments wen dishonot'ed
_
..9J',T.1'" first installments if they wen ovel'due and unpaid.
not follow, however, that the inst1'uments wen disin their entirety. Sinee an installment note can be
and unpaid as to eertain installments. but not overunpaid as to others, it can likewise be dishonored
~,~Oiq)&y:melnt as to eertain installments. but still not be
Ihllll'lOll'M as to others.
¥idulhOlnor by nonpayment of an installment when due
~ltallJlOlmt to dishonor of the instrument as to futul'e in- .
olbIIlenta, it would follow that even if that installment were i
.rra~l11tlly paid, the whole note would be regal'ded as "preCWlill0110rea." Consequently, knowledge of a transone installment was paid Jate would pnclude his
, holder in due eourse as to futul'e installments. for
'have notiee that the instrument was "previously
~\IRl'L," It is settled. however, under the provisions of
Negotiable Instruments Act with respect to
CWI:h011or to persons secondarily liable, that dishonor
auai .....u.u.'~n does not oonstitute dishonor of the note 8R
Seetin 3170 of the Civil Code (N.I.L.,
'ritcJVicles that "when a negotiable instrument has been
by nonaceeptance 01' nonpayment, notice of disbe given to the drawer and to each endorser, and
. or endorser to whom such notice is not given
1O.tIJ1U'g"ed." If dishonor' of the instrument as to one
,eonstituted dishonor of the instrument as to all
failUl'e of the holder to give notice of dishonor
period Pl'eSCribed as to one installment would deof the right to recover from the persons sec,"liable, when subsequent installments wen dishon18, established, however, that even though the holder
)0 give proper notice of dishonor as to an install- not prevented from giving such notice as to sub~'iD8:ta1llmeiDts that an not paid at their maturity
BIH·l:moit. v. Kasparewiu, 121 Conn. 140, 145 [183

/
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A. 693, 104 A.L.R. 1326]; Warner,e v. Preissner, 103 Conn.
503, 507 [131 A. 25]; Roberts v. International Bank, 25
F.2d 214, 216; Ohamberlain v. Oobb, 129 Wash. 54!>, 551
[225 P. 141]; see 10 C.J.S. 896; Uniform Laws Annotated,
Negotiable Instruments, n. 13 to § 89.}
An analogy is presented by the eases involving nonpayment of one of a series of notes. According to the cases deeided under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, knowledge of the dishonor of one of the notes does not con.'3titutc
notice that all of the notes of the series are dishonored.
(Hobart M. Oable 00. v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170, 171 [274 P.
665, 64 A.I •. R. 451]; M01'gan v. Farmington Ooal & Ooke 00.,
97 W.Va. 83, 99 [124 S.E. 591] ; Brannan, Negotiable Instruments 566; c/., however. 64 A.L.R. 457, 458 (collection of
eases decided under common law principles).}
The conclusion seems inescapable therefore that if knowledge of nonpayment of a past due installment precludes. a
purchaser from being a holder in due course as to unmatured
installments, it is not because of the provisions of subdivision
(2) of Civil Code section 3133 (N.I.L., § 52(2).) It remains
only to determine whether such a result is justified by the
provisions of subdivision (4).
Is notice 0/ the nonpayment 0/ an installment, as a matter
of law, notice 0/ I'any infirmity in the inst1"1Lment or deled
in thelitle 0/ the person negotiating" the note witkin the
meaning 0/ subdivision (I.) 0/ Oim1 Oode section 3133 (N.I.L.,
§ 52(I.)}' Section 3137 of the Civil Code (N.I.L., § 56) provides, UTo eonstitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same. the
person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect. or knowledge of s11ch facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith." Knowledge that an installment has not been paid
when due is clearly not actual knowledge of an infirmity in
the instrument itself or of a defect in the title of the person
negotiating it. To prevent the transferee from becoming a
holder in due course, such knowledge must therefore be knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith.
Under subdivision (4) of Civil Code, section 3133 (N.I.L.,
§ 52(4», therefore, if an installment is not paid when due,
notice of that fact does not, as a matter of law, preclude the
transferee from being a holder in due course. Such notice is

/

)
J'unel947] BLISS V.

C.UDORNIA COOPERATIVE PRODUCBBS

261

[30 C.2d 240 l 181 P.2d 369]

at most evidence of bad faith

to be weighed by the trier of

!acts with the other facts to determine whether the transferee
,

the note in question in good faith. Even if it be asthat such knowledge would be sufficient to put a pru·
man on inquiry to determine if the note was subject to
the transferee is not thereby deemed to have acquired
bad faith, for negligence is not a bar to recovery on
leacma,Dle instrument. Civil Code, section 3137 (N.I.L.,
makes the good or bad faith of the transferee the
In construing this provision, this court has fol·
general rule "that mere knowledge of facts suffi·
put a prudent man on inquiry, without actual know}·
.
suspicion of an infirmity or defect of title, does
bi'tllelU(le the transferee from occupying the position of a
course, unless the circumstances or suspicions
and obvious that to remain passive would amount
It
(Popp v. Exchange Bank, 189 Cal. 296, 303
; Goodale v. Thorn, 199 Cal. 307, 314 [249 P. 11];
l'(lll'.tL"l~tJ Sav. Bank v. Bent Br08., 207 Cal. 652, 656
Nuckolls v. Bank of Calif., 10 Cal.2d 278, 284
; Barthelme88 v. Cavalier, 2 Cal.App.2d 477,
484]; Imperial GYP8'Um ~ Oil Co. v. Chaplin,
~:LP}J'.''''u. 109, 113 [40 P.2d 5961; see 5 Uniform Laws
o;;K"WCI,U~" Instruments, n. 31·136 to § 56; Bran·
1IlK."'IoUi,U~" Instruments, 6th ed., 636-641; Rightmire,
in Negotiable Paper, 18 Mich.L.Rev. 355, 367.368;
","~."..._ and Notes, 411415; 81 U. of PaL.Rev. 617.)
.
section 56, • . • a purchaser is not charge·
of an infirmity or defect in the instrument
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
facts that his action in taking the instrubad faith.' The statute by its terms exiatl'nm:ive notice." (Allen v. Cooling, 161 Minn. 10,

.)
that one or more installments of an installUllJ;'lUU when the note is negotiated does not
~'~JD!l<n1rl6(llZ6 to the transferee of a defense against the
. it reveal such knowledge of. circumstances that
that the holder of the note shut his eyes to the
bad faith sought to avoid the kn<n1rledge of a
that respect there is no dUference between a trans.negotiable instrument with knowledge that one or
J ...

<."

•
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more installments of interest are unpaid and a transferee with
knowledge that one or more installments of principal are unpaid. Before the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act there was a conflict of authority with regard to the
effect of the late payment of an installment of interest. Under
the Uniform Act, however, the rule is now generally recognized to be that "knowledge that interest is due and unpaid
does not, of itself constitute bad faith, but such fact may be
taken into consideration by the jury along with other facts on
the issue of purchase in good. faith. " (Britton, Bills and
Notes, 456-457; City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity «t Deposit Co., 105 F.2d 348, 352.)
Similarly, notice of a default in the payment of an installment of principal disconnected from other facts does not prevent the transferee from being a holder in due course. Nor
does such notice alone constitute bad faith and put the holder
under a duty to make an inquiry. Even if good. faith would
require the transferee to make an inquiry, it would not necessarily follow that he could not still be a holder in due course.
The inquiry may reveal that the default is fully explained
by the circumstances and that it constitutes no warning that
the maker has a defense with regard to installments to mature
in the future. Thus, it may appear that prompt payment has
been waived and that· the delay with regard to one or more
past due installments does not exceed the delay in the payment of other installments that have been paid late in the
past. Failure to pay a past due installment may .arise from
unexpected circumstances affecting the ability of a maker to
pay rather than from an equitable defense. Many installment
notes containing an aece1eration clause provide that the holder
can accelerate future installments only if one or more past
installments remain unpaid for a specified period. In such
cases installments are frequently paid in the interval between
the maturity date of the installment and the date at which
under the terms of the note the holder would be entitled to
accelerate future payments. A rule would be contrary to
common experience that held in each case in which a past
due installment is unpaid, notice of such fact alone is notice
that the maker has a defense against future installments
payable under the note.
In my opinion, therefore, the rule set forth in the majority
opinion that a purchaser of an installment note who has knowledp that a past due installment was unpaid when he acquired
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the note "is put on inquiry that there may be some defenses
against it and . . . cannot be a holder in due course" cannot
be reconciled with the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable
,hstrwnents Act. The cases cited for this proposition include
three cases decided under the Uniform Negotiable Instru.. u.:,,=.... Act. Of these three cases, only one actually held that
late payment of an installment precludes a subsequent
I,'i~eha.ser from being a holder in due course. (Hibbard v.
t:{]OU,'I8, 127 Me. 383, 386 [143 A. 600).) That case in fact
notice was immaterial, apparently on the theory
n"~FWrlftAn the first installment was overdue the whole note was
(See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments, 566.) Obvimajority opinion in the present case is not based on
that the note was overdue as to all installments,
question whether plaintiffs are holders in due course
turn on whether or not they had notice of the noniWtIItent of an installment. In Oity of New Port Richey v.
tt Deposit 00., 105 F.2d 348. 352, there is a dictum
that notice of the nonpayment of an installment
a subsequent purchaser from being a holder in due
The actual holding of that' case, however, is that
nonpayment of interest, though not in law notice of
, is a fact to be considered with all other circumthe question of the bona fides of the taking." The
lHimtv opinion places great reliance on a statement in
State, v. Oapen, 55 F.Supp. 81, 83, but the actual dethat case turned on a rule adopted in some jurisdicwhere an installment note contains an automatic
W4tta1:ion clause and the maker fails to pay the tirst installwhole note is automatically overdue. (Cf., however,
il'fttn." Zook, 125 Cal.App. 19, 22 [13 P.2d 518]; Sullivan
!JItjillMfI,. 25 Cal.App.2d 422, 425 [77 P.2d 498].)
decided under common law principles, the one
Tdeeid:iDg' the question under the Uniform Negotiable Inand the dicta in the other cases relied on in
rJliJi~jol'ity opinion, are all based on the theory that the
was a purchaser of overdue paper or was a purnotice of dishonor. {See Britton, Bills and Notes.
has already been observed that there is no suppo ....
theory in the provisions of the Uniform Negotiabic
Act. The majority opinion cannot be brought
purview of that act unless it is regarded as hold<,
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ing that as a matter of law anyone who purchases an installment note with knowledge that an installment is unpaid
is a purchaser in bad faith. But even then it cannot be reconciled with the act, as is well illustrated by the facts of
the present ease.
Plaintiifs gave a loan of $5,000 to a corporation in which
they had no int(rest and with which they had no other busi.
ness connections. Even if they knew that the hat installments had not been paid and good faith required an inquiry
when the notes were pledged, such an inquiry could not have '
revealed the defense of subsequent failure of consideration I
now set up to bar their recovery on the notes. Plaintiffs could
not learn in advance that years later the corporation would
become insolvent and be unable to perform its obligations
under ita contract with the makers. The role adopted by the
majority of this court actually empowers the maker of an insta11m.ent note to render the note nonnegotiable by refusing !
to pay an insta11m.ent, for knowledge of that facts precludes a ;
transferee's being a holder in due course. Such a role contra- !
dicta the basic principle of the statute that a transferee of a
negotiable instrument is not required, except by considerations of honesty and good faith, to enter upon an inquiry
with regard to transactions that have given rise to the issuance of the instrument.
If the principles set forth in the Uniform Negotiable Instrumenta Act are applied to this ease, knowledge that the first
insta11m.ents were not paid would not as a matter of law prevent plaintitrs from being holders in due course. It would
merely be evidence that plaintitr8 might not have acquired
the notes in good faith. Good faith may require a transferee
to make an inquiry on the basis of such knowledge depending on the facta of the particular case. What constitutes good
faith is essentially a question of fact and depends on the
circumstances in each case. For example. if the purchaser
knew that one or niore of the installments were not paid on
the due date and made a reasonable inquiry that revealed only
that the payments had not been made because of some reason
unconnected with any defense, be 8hould not be barred from
recovery on the note merely because of subsequent failure of
consideration, a defense that could not have been known at the
time. On the other hand, if the purchaser acquired the note
with knowledge that several installments had not been paid,
it would appear that he failed to act in good faith if he failed
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'fa. ~make

an inquiry, unless the lIurrounding circumstances
that this failure was attributable to negligence and not
·dishonesty. Such que.c:;tions, however, are que.c:;tion.c:; of fact
the trial court or jury and should only be considered matonaw when the facts are not in conflict and not reason·
.• sUsceptible of conflicting inferences.
the holding of the majority opinion. the negotiability
llUJUUllmeu~ notes has been seriously impaired. After any
• . . , . . - . ,..n
has matured, it is unsafe for a purchaser, even
he acta in good faith, to acquire such a note without
. eertaiil that all past due installments have been paid. .
as a holder in due course may be questioned at some
by the maker's merely asserting that an install.. unpaid at the time of the transfer and that the
had. knowledge of that fact. [n such a situation.
had a defense that involves the title of the payee,
f~~dEIr' would have the burden of showing that either the
was paid when due or that he had no notice of
• (Civ. Code, § 3140; N.I.L., § 59.) In view of the
. responsibility of the trier of facts under decisions
, (see Estate of B1'istol, 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 (143
) there is always the risk that the evidence might
smieeptible of an inference that the holder had notice
of a past due installment.
.... ··nnn.... the rule of law announced in the majority
is unnecessary to remand this ease to the trial court
.
of notice.
court found "That the first installment of each
given to plaintiff as security for the note of
Producers were past due on its face at the
transfer of said noteR to plaintiffs, and that plainholders in due course of said collateral notes; but
finds that said plaintiffs were purchasers and
notes in good faith and !Of' value and without
.. equity or defense of defendants or any of
(Italics added.) It was the position of the de'the trial that the notice of nonpayment of the
~lLlJ:Jnelllts was irrelevant since the date for the pay:.JOIl4'l'eCll had passed before the notes were transferred to
the principles already discussed, the effect
nonpayment of a prior installment is pertinent
question whether or not the purchaser acquired
.~ood faith. Since there was no evidence that
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plaintiffs were not holders in due course, except in regard to
the first installments, it is obvious that the "finding" that
plaintiffs were not holders in due course is based upon defendants' theory and is an erroneous conclusion of law.
Since the trial court found that plaintiffs were holders of
the notes in question "in good faith and for value without
notice of an equity or defense of defendants," it follows that
the plaintiffs are holders in due course. This finding on its
face, under the foregoing principles of law, can mean only one
of two things: (1) plaintiffs purchased the notes without
knowledge that the first installments were unpaid, or (2) even
if the first installments were not paid when due and plaintiffs
had knowledge of that fact, under the circumstances of the
case, plaintiffs were nonetheless acting in good faith when
they acquired the notes. Since either question is one of good I
faith, if either theory is supported by the evidence, the judg- i
ment must be affirmed. except to the extent that it allows
plaintiffs to recover against defendant Winchester for the
first installment of her note. This installment was either
paid before the transfer of the note or was subject to defenses. Since it was overdue, plaintiffs were not holders in
due course as to it.
Even if it is assumed that under the facts of the present
case the trial court would not have found that plaintiffs were
purchasers in good faith if it believed that the plaintiffs had
notice of the nonpayment of the first installment. the reaaonable construction of the finding in regard to the good faith of
plaintiffs is that they acquired the notes without such notice.
A holder of a negotiable instrument is "deemed prima facie
a holder in due course .. " (Civ. Code. § 3140. N.I.L., § 59),
and a person who acquires an installment note after an installment is due is entitled to rely on the presumption that the
due course of business has been followed. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1963.) Since it is an established principle that all inferences and presumption must be applied to support the judgmeat of the court. the trial court's finding that the plaintiff
acquired the notes in question as "purchasers and holders 0
said notes in good faith and for value and without notice 0
any equity or defense of defendants . . ." must be construe
as a finding that the notes were acquired without notice 0
nonpayment of the first installments.
The remaining question is whether this construction of th
finding is supported by the evidence. The principal plaintifli
- - that he knew nothing of the status of the
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Dotes and that be relied on the recommendation of a Mr.
Andel'l'On, the president of a bank that later acted as plain~ agent in delivering the notes. Plaintiff testified that Mr.
'Anderson told him that the notes would be secured by grow8it/... DOtes but that Mr. Anderson did not tell him of the
of the grow,,,,' not...
',,»ef,
' endants introduced no evidence sufficient to controvert
, . testimony. Mr. Anderson was called as defendants' wit. , ·.but he was able to state only that he advised one of the
MidntJml that the corporation would use the money to start
...."', ......~... in Sacramento and that it would be advantageous
and to this plaintiff. Mr. Anderson te..<;tified that
not recall whether at that time he knew anything
status of the growers' notes. The testimony of this
was struck from the record as irrelevant. Defendants
that the testimony was admissible to show that the
knew of the status of the notes and that he was plain&gent. The only agency shown, however, was that the
bank was subsequently the agent for the delivery of
and none of the testimony struck tended to show that
had any knowledge of the nonpayment or of any
available to defendant..q at that time.
contended that an inference that plaintiffs had notice
first installment was overdue could be drawn from
that the $5,000 note from the California Cooperative
contained a list of the installment notes transferred
u~~t;Uf8 as security, because this li..<;t designated the full
rllllinOlmt of each of the pledged notes. It is evident on
the principal note, however, that the full amounts
for purposes of identification. It was necessary to
full face amount of each note, since the principal
tulC1l1ted by the corporation, after enumerating the notes
, stated, "The maker her('.of may, while not
substitute as security hereunder, in place of any
note or notes, note or notes of its grower members, of
.
form and character." Even if the trial court
reasonably inferred from the listing of the notes
full amounts that plaintiffs had knowledge of the
RVTn ...'T of the first installments, it was free to draw or
draw such an inference.

r
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J.. concurred.
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